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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There is more to the Precautionary Principle (PP) than is generally understood. It is a 
guide for coping with a world that we will never fully understand, let alone ‘control’.
The PP reminds us that we can never be certain of the consequences of what we are 
doing, no matter how sophisticated our scientific understanding or our models. Pre-
caution is about overcoming our undue faith in our own ‘omniscience’ or ‘omnipotence’. 
This perspective is more important than ever as we create new synthetic products, in-
cluding even synthetic life, and as we meddle, at our existential risk, with our climate. 
Yet the future of the Precautionary Principle is threatened.
The Precautionary Principle tends to be out of favour with those who are focused on 
promoting growth, trade and investment, for it is often mistakenly regarded merely 
as an impediment. But when treated responsibly precaution is a liberating influence 
on sustainable development. As well as reinforcing decency, fairness and compassion, 
the PP can also stimulate research and innovation of its own. If some existing prac-
tice is shown to be potentially risky, then corporate business-as-usual will search for 
excuses to avoid changing it; whereas the Precautionary Principle demands that we 
seek out a route that avoids ecocidal hazards, often through an innovative new route. 
As noted in the 1990 Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development, which directly 
connected the importance of taking caution pro-actively into account in innovation 
with the achievement of sustainable development: 
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary 
principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental 
degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The PP provides one of the key guidelines for EU environmental policy. It appears in 
the Maastricht Treaty by requiring the EU to commit to a “high level of protection” 
alongside the preventative, removal at source, proportionality, and polluter pays prin-
ciples of EU environmental policy and decision making. The principle of proportion-
ality is particularly salient here, for this seeks to ensure that a precautionary action 
(such as banning a product) must take into account the judgmental balance over 
benefits and costs and to whom, including future generations.
Precaution also contains a directive for all humanity to be stewards for all future gen-
erations of / the foundations of life. The central purpose of this briefing is to address 
the real danger that precaution may be reconstrued, or even lost altogether, in the 
repatriation process associated with Brexit. 
Precaution does not fit in well with the trading and intellectual framework of the US, 
where ‘science-led’ rather than risk–led approaches are more customary. This is a (re-
lated) reason why it is at risk of being stifled or junked, in post-Brexit trade deals. It is 
also likely that any diminution of the precautionary principle could take place via the 
use of statutory instruments. This routing might restrict the scope of full Parliamenta-
ry scrutiny, yet offer a means for narrowing the scope for judicial review.
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Introduction
In international law the Precautionary Principle’s most widespread accepted form is that found in the 
Rio Declaration: Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
Exactly this form of the Precautionary Principle was then adopted by the UNFCCC and the Biodiversity 
Convention. Prior to these statements was the Bergen Declaration which placed the precautionary 
principle firmly within the emerging framework of sustainable development: In order to achieve sus-
tainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. Environmental measures 
must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation
The Maastricht Treaty also adopted the Principle in Article 130r(2). This states that: Community policy 
on the environment... shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principle that preventative 
action should be taken.... 
The Precautionary Principle works for us in this country simultaneously at three levels:
The PP is most palpably part of UK law by being part of EU law. The PP 
will be re-absorbed into UK legislation as part of the ‘EU Withdrawal 
Bill’. After re-absorption, the PP will be vulnerable to elimination on a 
simple Parliamentary vote. Our view, along with the mainstream of rel-
evant organisations working on this, is that there must be no weaken-
ing of existing EU environmental protections in UK policy framing and 
connected law.
Macrory and Thornton (2017) summarise all of the relevant EU envi-
ronmentally related principles: Eleven principles were included in the 
Council Resolution, and the subsequent Action Programme,  many of 
which are familiar today: prevention, taking into account the environ-
ment at the earliest stages of planning, avoiding ecological damage, im-
proving scientific knowledge, polluters pay, no damage to another state, 
take into account developing countries, improve regional and global 
cooperation, improve information, intervene at the appropriate level, 
and coordinate policies with the European Community.
Unlike other principles such as ‘polluter pays’, the precautionary prin-
ciple does not have a formal legal standing on its own feet, making it 
particularly vulnerable to amendment or removal. But its appearance 
RECOMMENDATIONS
What can Parliament do to safeguard and enhance the Precautionary Principle?
• Stand up for it in the accounting role for Parliament over the Brexit repatriation process.
• Ensure its legal history and appropriate legal interpretations are brought into a common 
framework within UK policy making and connected law.
• Champion it for the tough regulation of all novel products, and for exploring at the ill-
understood margins of anthropogenic climate change and other major ecological threats.
• Help place it in the forthcoming paradigms of the emerging economics of sustainability 
and wellbeing, including limiting and redirecting patterns of growth.
• Work to establish it securely on all learning curricula in schools, colleges, universities and 
professional accreditation programmes.
• Battle for it in creating procedures to safeguard the interests of all future generations. 
• Place it centrally in any future White Paper preceding any eventual Environment Act.
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in the Maastricht Treaty gives it, crucially, a degree of legal standing in 
EU law. Macrory and Thornton (2017) cover the relevant interpretations. 
The application of the precautionary principle must take account of the 
overarching principle of proportionality, as otherwise it is unworkable. 
Also there has to be sufficient scientific evidence, supported where ap-
propriate by informed opinion, that an identifiable risk must be taken 
into account and proportionately remedied by the perpetrator of the 
risk. 
This interpretation offers a lower threshold than full evidence-base, or 
proof. But it does mean that potentially hazardous actions or products 
require systematic appraisal even when the full risks are not fully sci-
entifically proven. This is crucial, for reasons we elaborate on below.
Here, Parliamentarians can play a crucial leadership role by challeng-
ing the dangerous prejudice which assumes that, without strong evi-
dence, one has nothing reliable with which to question advocates of 
some new technology, or deniers of a possible new threat. The burden 
of proof needs to be upon those doing something risky to provide evi-
dence that this something will not be seriously or irreversibly harmful.
The Secretary of State for DEFRA, in his ‘Green Brexit’ speech, lays down 
a challenge to which we should hold the government. Its future will-
ingness to endorse the precautionary principle should be made a test 
of the seriousness of the Secretary of State’s challenge: When we speak 
as a Government of Global Britain it is not just as a leader in security or 
an advocate for trade that we should conceive of our global role but also 
a champion of sustainable development, an advocate for social justice, a 
leader in environmental science, a setter of gold standards in protecting 
and growing natural capital, an innovator in clean, green, growth and 
an upholder of the moral imperative to hand over our planet to the next 
generation in a better condition than we inherited it. (Michael Gove in a 
speech to WWF 21st July 2017)
The Secretary of State’s speech was full of warm words and good in-
tentions, some of them quite specific and encouraging for safeguarding 
environmental policy (though, in the context of this APPG, naturally the 
siren call of “clean, green growth” (sic) should sound a warning-bell). In 
the course of his defence of science and sustainability, however, he did 
not include a commitment to retaining the PP. Rather, this is what he 
said: But it is only by adherence to scientific method, through recognising 
the vital importance of testing and re-testing hypotheses in the face of new 
evidence, through scrupulous adherence to empirical reasoning, that we 
can be certain our policies are the best contemporary answer to the eternal 
questions of how we live well and honour the world we have inherited and 
must pass on to our children.
This sounds like the standard evocation of “evidence-basedness” that 
we question in this briefing. Our contention is that this shows clearly 
that more needs to be done through moral and political discourse so 
that the PP is not legally lost to us. Our worry is that, in the midst of the 
Secretary of State’s warm words, there is no warmth toward precaution. 
Nor is there any indication that precaution would appear in any formal 
policy document.
The PP and science
The PP takes us beyond the fashionable obsession with being ‘evidence-based’. Having a solid 
evidence-base that points firmly in the direction of one particular policy-solution is not always 
possible. It is dangerously inappropriate to continue to insist that, without such an evidence-base, 
no action should be taken.
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Standard scientific methodology works well for establishing with reasonable confidence how 
reality appears to work, over time. Standard scientific methodology shoots down rash claims, and 
demands evidence. But this approach is not appropriate for situations where, by the time all the 
evidence is in, it will/would be too late to stop grave harm.
Risks of ruin—of disaster such as ecocide—should be considered far weightier than benefits. This 
is because any potential benefits of a technology, such as GMO or synthetic biology, cannot out-
weigh the potential for a truly disastrous outcome, even if the chances of that outcome occurring 
are relatively small. Such risks are of necessity rare: i.e. they nearly always haven’t happened (yet). 
But it is reckless to allow any conceivable risk of them happening, precisely because they are 
potentially ruinous. This is one of the great features of the precautionary principle. It is where the 
fashion for being ‘evidence-based’ runs into the sand.
Why are scientists often reluctant to accept this? One reason is that there can be a connection 
between normal scientific methodology and a scepticism about the task of socially assessing 
technologies, manifested in precautionary reasoning. 
Let us explain. Scientists are typically concerned to avoid false positives, or ‘false alarms’. This bias 
explains why many scientists are relatively cautious in claiming connections between extreme 
weather events and anthropogenic climate change. If one is willing to take the risk of acting upon 
what may turn out to be ‘false positives’, then one might be shown to having been more pessimis-
tic than the circumstances warrant. 
Yet the risk of operating on the basis of false negatives is arguably far worse. Here we have in 
mind the avoidance, or ignorance, of a (potentially) serious unanticipated outcome.  If one sticks 
too tightly to the normal scientific habit of awaiting the evidence and avoiding false alarms, one 
may be complicit in a situation where something genuinely and massively alarming and dreadful 
occurs—without anyone having adequately warned against it.
Before the introduction of the precautionary principle, the international order did not have a 
secure way of facilitating an appropriate methodology for scientific and social deliberations of 
this nature, concerning wide spreads of risk and uncertainty. There was little political currency 
for careful examination and assessment of the downsides of possible and plausible longer term 
outcomes from potentially-dangerous actions. Hence precaution was established for ensuring a 
more reflective and weighted approach to preparing for uncertain and potentially destabilising 
global and local futures for people and nature. In order not to give a false sense of reassurance 
that could then ‘legitimate’ actions that turned out to be harmful, the PP seeks to ensure that such 
harms do not knowingly occur; it does so by reversing the normal burden of proof.
The opponents of the PP want any infringement on corporate freedom to depend upon an ex-
pert-led cast-iron evidence base. They want the population at large meanwhile to shoulder the 
burden of a silent risk. They want to be able to profit now from technologies that may end up 
proving catastrophic.
Nigel Haigh, a noted scholar on EU environmental law and policy, notes the inherent strength of 
the PP in the minds of EU legislators, referencing the European Commission’s document on the 
subject: Whether or not to invoke the Precautionary Principle is a decision exercised where scientific 
information is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain and where there are indications that the possible 
effects on the environment, or human, animal or plant health may be potentially dangerous, and incon-
sistent with the chosen level of protection (CEC Communication COM (2000)1)
Haigh contrasts this with the more ‘pragmatic’ American approach to precaution: These reserva-
tions are probably culturally conditioned, with Anglo-Saxon countries, who pride themselves on their 
pragmatism, shying away from the idea of elevating the common-sense notion of taking precaution 
into a principle that might involve unpredictable legal constraints.
The American approach, which could be pushed for hard in a trade deal with the Trump White 
House, would create exactly the kinds of silent risks that we just outlined.
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1998), in its profound report on setting envi-
ronmental standards, adjudged that precaution has a key legitimate role in the shaping of policy, 
and in the needful drive to extend proportion to wider and longer social and moral judgements 
over avoidable, but not provable, dangers. In so doing, it not only canvassed the huge social sci-
ence dispute over social framing of risk; it also raised the crucial value-laden issues of possible 
future harm where the outcomes to be avoided or desired have to be based on social/democratic 
participation and not only either scientific or political-governmental analysis. In the way, the 
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Commission sought to defuse the long running concern that precaution was being used as a 
Trojan horse for strong-willed environmentalists.
But that (we would argue) illegitimate concern is still being stoked by some in public life. They 
are looking for opportunities to ditch the PP. And thus we offer this warning: If the UK wishes to 
enter into a full-blooded trade deal with the US and other countries, then it may ‘have to’ reinter-
pret the precautionary principle towards the prevailing transatlantic mode. This might restrict, or 
even preclude, the scope for a UK home-made legal interpretation of the precautionary principle.
Hence our encouragement of the APPG and of Parliamentarians more generally to address the 
scope for a more secure policy and legal basis for post-Brexit Britain when it comes to applying/
entrenching the precautionary principle.
Precaution as an expression of sensitivity to limits-to-growth
The mantra of “clean” or “green” growth is very attractive, but misleading. There is a responsibility 
upon politicians to reconsider the limits to growth debate, initiated by this APPG—limits2growth.
org.uk/revisited.
Often, the argument is made against advocates of limits to growth that we are not certain that we 
have accurately identified these limits, and that there may be more space for economic growth 
remaining than the limits to growth discourse suggests. But that attitude eschews precaution. 
Precaution lowers the ‘threshold’ for serious concern. In a criminal court, one needs to prove 
something beyond reasonable doubt. But the spirit of precaution suggests that it is highly impru-
dent to require such a high threshold of evidence, when the costs of inaction in the meantime 
may be high. If and where we are uncertain about where the limits to growth are, then we should 
be more precautious, not less.
The precautious thing to do, is not to gamble on the limits to growth thesis/discourse being 
wrong. Precaution provides a powerful argument for taking the limits to growth thesis very seri-
ously indeed, even if it be accepted that it is unproven. This is the stewardship role for humanity: 
one which underpins cautious consumption, and questions whether more growth is necessary 
—or reckless.
The example of precaution and climate
Take the most pressing known global limit to growth at present: the limited capacity of the Earth 
system to absorb further greenhouse gas emissions, and the increasing evidence of dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change resulting from that capacity being already being breached. 
In this case, evidence-based (climate-)science already provides a sufficient basis for radical action 
to contain the threat. However, the PP is relevant everywhere where the climate science is less 
than certain. That includes many factors: such as feedbacks and tipping points. In these connec-
tions, the PP is a vital counsel for strong precautious action now. Here are key examples:
‘Climate-sceptics’ emphasise the uncertainties in many aspects/frontiers of climate science. They 
are right. What they haven’t understood is that uncertainty makes the argument for climate-ac-
tion stronger, not weaker. Uncertainties cut both ways. If we are uncertain where tipping points 
are, or what the climate-sensitivity lies, then we should be more precautious, not less. Because 
the outcome is harder to control, and could be even worse than we had feared. It is cherry-picking 
to assume that uncertainty always points in the direction of climate science being ‘alarmist’. The 
reverse may well be true.
The PP offers an independent argument for strong action on climate, even to those unconvinced 
by climate-science. It has the capacity to persuade, on the basis that even a low probability of the 
climate science being right demands that we act strongly and precautiously. Because if it is right, 
we are risking catastrophe.
Looking back over the last generation, and especially over the last few years, there has been a 
persistent tendency for various outcomes and indicators to exceed the ‘likely worst-case scenari-
os’ of climate modellers. Consider the unprecedented Arctic temperatures and diminishing sea ice 






Consider too, ‘geo-engineering’, aka ‘climate-engineering’. This idea, of accepting raised levels of 
CO2 emissions, and of seeking to engineer the workings of the planet (e.g. via ‘solar radiation 
management’ (e.g. mirrors in space), etc.) to avoid the harmful consequences of those raised will 
become increasingly popular in the next few years, as it becomes clear how we have failed to 
listen to climate science, failed to act precautiously, and are moving inexorably closer to the 
dangerous 1.5 degree temperature-rise threshold. But geo-engineering is a highly reckless re-
sponse to this situation, not a precautious one at all. By definition, there can be little that would 
constitute good evidence that geo-engineering is a bad idea, before it takes place. Here is where 
we can apply the Precautionary Principle. We ought to seek a route to climate-safety, if one exists, 
that does not rely on an untried and hazardous experiment with the whole Earth. That route is 
something like an emergency brake on emissions.
We do not know exactly how much by way of greenhouse-gas emissions it will take to (say) set 
the Amazon rainforest on fire, and turn it from a carbon sink to a carbon source, turning it even-
tually into savannah. The science is inexact, the evidence imponderable, the future uncertain. But 
we know that, if we wait until we know for sure, it will be too late: by the time this tipping point 
is reached, if it is, then a new profound climate chaos and (probably) runaway climate change will 
be upon us. The precautious thing to do is to act now so that we can be confident that this tipping 
point will never be reached. In short: no matter how good our modeling of tipping points and 
feedbacks such as this one get, we shouldn’t be so reckless as to test them, nor as to wait until we 
know for sure before acting. The PP demands that we act now, as if the rainforest were at risk of 
complete destruction on a business-as-usual path (as it probably, but not certainly, is).
New frontiers for precaution
The deep need to rein in ‘silent risks’ is, we are now realizing, wider-spread than ever. For in fields 
such as endocrine-disruption and radiation, it is now clear that “the dose does not always make 
the poison’’. Lower doses can be more harmful than higher doses. This sounds paradoxical. In 
order to see that it is possible, consider as an exemplar what a high dose of radiation may do to a 
cell: kill it. That is harmful, but potentially less harmful than what a lower dose may do to a cell: 
turn it cancerous.
It is increasingly unclear whether there is any safest low dose of some forms of toxic substances. 
This yields a revolutionary new argument favouring the strengthening and wider deployment of 
the Precautionary Principle. Until we are presented with strong empirical grounds for believing 
otherwise, we need to consider (and act on) the possibility in any new field or novel technology 
that lower doses might be more harmful than higher doses. Until one has reliable epidemiologi-
cal good reason to believe that a low dose actually is safe, one should precautiously assume that 
it is not. Thus, in contrast to what is widely assumed, there is good reason to believe that there 
may be no safe dose of any novel product or process which is not yet fully tested.
Brexit and Precaution
For all the reasons outlined above, it is vitally important at this time to consider the impact there 
would be if the PP were dropped in formal UK documents. It is desirable for the PP to be enshrined 
in UK law that carries over existing EU legislation that refers to the PP in order to ensure that deci-
sions made under such legislation cannot be challenged in a UK court on the grounds that the hazard 
has not been scientifically established beyond doubt. The PP also needs to be enshrined in some way 
so that new UK legislation can (also) be based on the PP without challenge.
Unless the Precautionary principle is specifically incorporated into any new UK law, or appears as 
part of formal UK policy in the form of being incorporated into a White Paper (a formal guide to 
policy setting) and eventually a new act, then (with Brexit) its current role may end. Furthermore 
its role in guiding any judicial review process will also attenuate. This is why we advocate that the 
principle needs to be placed on a combination of a policy and legal footing (to ensure its basis for 
adjudication in any judicial review) through the auspices of a fully comprehensive Environment 
Act. 
Macrory and Thornton (2017) note that modern environmental law has to grapple with a wide 
range of interpretations of science, evidence, public and private spheres, and changing social and 
political cultures and values. They note that any transfer of environmental laws and regulations 




The model of town and country planning legislation can provide a useful pointer where national govern-
ment guidance and policy is contained in non-legal documents but given some explicit legal connection 
to the planning system. If environmental principles are to play a legal role, future environment legis-
lation could adopt a similar model by incorporating them in government policy documents rather the 
legislation itself but then making a link to decision-making under the relevant legislation.
This could be a model for how to plan the future of the PP.
CONCLUSION
The Precautionary Principle reminds us of our responsibilities as stewards for our bequeathed 
wondrous nature, to which we give no voice and towards which too often we turn a deaf ear. 
It jolts us into giving proper attention to the lifeworlds of all future generations, both human and 
natural, for whom at present there is no reliable political representation.
It forces us to devise new ways of communicating and listening so that all creators of possible 
harm must show that all reasonable means of reducing any such harm are fully considered, 
factored into all life cycles of decisions, processes and products, and widely understood.
It makes science a conversation about sharing knowledge, feelings, aspirations and trust, thus 
essentially becoming an integral part of democratic politics. In this context managing growth and 
consumption for satisfaction rather than satiation is very much part of precaution.
It raises the sights of the law above what we are certain of, to take care of us in contexts—notably 
many environmental contexts—where we are not certain, but where waiting for certainty would 
be waiting dangerously long; too long.
The PP challenges the growthist paradigm of mainstream economics because it gives ascendency 
to leaving room for nature to breathe. This is the vital idea of ‘ecological space’: the PP prevents 
us from pushing right up against (and over!) the limits to growth.
Precaution has implications for the scale and purpose of business and of trade in the crucial 
context of limits to growth. We need to remain within planetary boundaries and always to bear in 
mind our collective responsibilities to social fairness and (more basically) to habitability. 
A vital facet of this responsibility at the present time is: retaining the PP in UK law, and placing it 
centrally in the framing of any Environment Act, as outlined above.
References
Haigh, N, 2016. EU Environmental Policy: its journey to central stage. Earthscan, London, Chapter 13.
Macrory, R and Thornton, J, 2017. Environmental principles: will they have a legal basis after Brexit? Journal 
of Planning an Environmental Law (in press)
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1998. Setting Environmental Standards. The Stationary 
Office. London.
About the authors
This briefing document is co-authored by Dr. Rupert Read (Reader in Philosophy, University of 
East Anglia; Chair of Green House) and Prof. Tim O’Riordan (Emeritus Professor in Environmental 
Science, UEA; former member of the Sustainable Development Commission), autumn 2017. 
Download
This  briefing an be accessed on our website: www.limits2growth.org.uk/precautionary-principle
7
The aim of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Limits to Growth is to provide a new platform for cross-party 
dialogue on economic prosperity in a time of environmental and social transition. The APPG is chaired by Caroline Lucas 
MP. Its principal aims are:
• to create the space for cross-party dialogue on specific economic risks related to environmental and social limits;
• to assess the evidence for such limits, identify the risks and build support for appropriate responses; and
• to contribute to the international debate on redefining prosperity and measures of growth.
The Secretariat for the APPG on Limits to Growth is provided by the Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity 
(CUSP) at the University of Surrey, under the direction of Prof Tim Jackson, former Economics Commissioner of the UK 
Sustainable Development Commission.
Find us online: www.limits2growth.org.uk
on Limits to Growth
_design: kultur.work 
_print: greenhousegraphics.co.uk
